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STATE EFFORTS TO CLOSE
THE HEALTH COVERAGE GAP
This review examines prominent state efforts to expand health coverage to the remaining uninsured. It analyzes
and compares efforts in Massachusetts, Vermont, Colorado, California, and Nevada and highlights insights and
themes that emerge. It explores the context and climate for reform within the state, stakeholder involvement,
political coalitions, financing, and possible opposition. As such, it serves as a case study in how different states
build, or fail to build, the popular and political will towards health care coverage for all residents. This is the first in
a series of reports that will monitor and analyze developments at the state level to expand coverage and improve
access to care.

There is a health coverage gap in the United States, with nearly
28 million individuals lacking health insurance coverage. While
health insurance is not a guarantee of affordable health care or
better health outcomes, recent evidence indicates that expanding
coverage increases patients’ access to primary care, preventive care,
chronic illness treatment, medications, and surgery. State and federal
governments have grappled with their role in ensuring coverage,
attempting to close the coverage gap with a mix of public and/or
private programs.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 was the most recent
federal attempt to fill gaps in health coverage, and it made
significant progress in reducing the uninsured rate. It is notable that
as a compromise agreement, the ACA focused on incremental
improvements rather than large-scale overhaul, particularly in the
expansion of Medicaid and changes to the individual insurance
market. Even if the ACA had been implemented as originally written,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that it would
have left 23 million nonelderly people uninsured in 2019.
Overall, the goal of expanding coverage to the remaining uninsured
enjoys general public support, but there is little consensus around
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policies to get us there. Further federal movement in that direction
is unlikely in the immediate future, given the recent gridlock of the
federal government. However, there has been activity at the state
level toward this goal in recent years.
This review focuses on prominent state efforts that have, or had, as
their primary goal to close the coverage gap, and highlights insights
and themes that emerge. Other states have targeted important and
relevant issues such as controlling health care costs, stabilizing private
markets, improving choice, and increasing price transparency, all of
which may help to expand coverage, but these efforts are beyond the
scope of this review.
Overall, this review serves as a case study in how different states
build, or fail to build, the popular and political will towards health care
coverage for all residents. What might we learn across the experience
of very different states, proposing very different solutions? We
explore the importance of the current coverage gap within the state,
building public will, stakeholder involvement, political coalitions,
financing, and possible opposition.
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MASSACHUSETTS (2006)
Massachusetts passed a health care reform bill in 2006 that became
a model for the national effort that resulted in the ACA. It achieved
nearly universal coverage in the state, covering 97% of all residents as
of 2009.
Elements of Reform. The Massachusetts reform expanded Medicaid
coverage; created state-subsidized insurance for low-income people
not eligible for Medicaid; merged the individual and small-group
insurance markets; instituted an employer “fair share assessment” and
an individual mandate; and created the Commonwealth Connector,
an insurance marketplace that also set coverage and affordability
standards.
Climate for Reform. It is important to realize that Massachusetts
was building on prior reforms to the individual marketplace, including
guaranteed issue and community rating, and that the state had
already broadened Medicaid eligibility under an 1115 waiver. The
uninsured rate among the non-elderly was relatively low before
the reform (10.9%, about 532,000 people), which dropped to
5.5% in the year after implementation. Massachusetts had other
characteristics conducive to successful reform: it had a relatively high
per capita income and large rate of employer-sponsored coverage.
Massachusetts had also created an uncompensated care pool in 1985,
to help compensate hospitals for otherwise unpaid care.
A motivating factor in reform was revenue shortfalls and projected
state budget deficits that confronted the newly elected Governor
Romney in 2003. Medicaid provider payments were cut an average
of 3%-5% for hospitals, nursing homes, physicians, pharmacists, and
managed care organizations. Enrollment and eligibility cutbacks were
in the works as well. The existing system seemed fiscally unsustainable.
One other immediate motivation was the impending expiration of the
Medicaid waiver, which put more than $385 million in federal funds at
risk without further reforms.
Political Support. The plan was introduced by a Republican
governor, and endorsed by prominent Democrats, business leaders,
consumer advocates, insurance executives, clergy, and hospital
CEOs. The plan was three years in the making, beginning with a
Blue Cross Blue Shield Foundation-funded initiative that developed
a comprehensive “Roadmap to Coverage.” Developed over two
years with multi-stakeholder involvement, the Roadmap presented
a plan that minimized 1) disruption to the employer market; 2) the
need for new revenues; and 3) expansion of the government’s role.
A central theme in the political debate was the need for “shared
responsibility”— the idea that individuals, employers, and government
would all need to contribute to achieving access to health care for all
residents. A survey conducted six months after passage (but before
implementation) found that 64% of Massachusetts residents were
largely supportive of the new law.

Financing. In keeping with the theme of shared responsibility, the
plan was financed by raising the level of funding from both the public
and private sector. The financing of the plan “worked” because the
new burden on taxpayers was presented as primarily a redirection
of existing funding, with minimal impact on the state budget. After
reform, with revenues redirected as shown in Figure 1, the net new
spending was $591 million, of which $172 million — less than 1% of the
state budget — came from the state’s general fund.
“Shared responsibility” was more than a slogan —a 2009 report
found that the overall distribution of spending on health insurance
by employers, individuals, and government remained essentially the
same between 2005 and 2007. Only about half of the more than
400,000 residents who gained coverage by the end of 2008 were
publicly subsidized. In 2009, two Massachusetts officials noted that
“the individual mandate and employer incentives have provided good
value for Massachusetts taxpayers, costing about $1,060 in net new
spending per newly covered resident in 2008. The state succeeded in
enacting a government program that stimulated private parties to use
private dollars to help fulfill a public good.”
Governing/Decisionmaking Body. The statute established the
quasi-public Commonwealth Connector, an insurance-purchasing
exchange, led by the Connector Board, composed of various
stakeholders, including consumers, business, and labor. The board
was charged with defining affordability, negotiating premium rates
with health plans, developing consumers’ cost-sharing provisions, and
defining the minimum benefits package. Significantly, Massachusetts
did not include cost-control mechanisms such as rate setting or
restrictions on cost growth.
KEY INSIGHTS:
• T
 he Massachusetts reforms were built on pre-ACA scaffolding
that included a low proportion of uninsured residents, a highly
regulated insurance market, and significant state spending on an
uncompensated care pool.
• M
 ost of the residents that gained insurance did so through
employers, thereby avoiding the political problems that a massive
growth in government spending might produce.
• B
 ipartisanship—with support from a Democratic legislature and
a Republican governor—reduced partisan divides and minimized
entrenched opposition by party lines.
• T
 he reform maintained the balance of funding across sectors,
thereby minimizing narratives about “winners” and “losers.”
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FIGURE 1
The Financing of Massachusetts Health Care Reform*
Source

Financing before
Reform
Fiscal Year 2006, Actual

Additional Financing,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009

Financing after Reform
Fiscal Year 2007, Actual

Fiscal Year 2008, Actual

Fiscal Year 2009, Estimated

millions of dollars
Spending
MassHealth
Commonwealth Care

770

511

642

795

0

133

628

805

UCP-HSTNF

656

665

416

417

Total

1,426

1,309

1,686

2,017

Additional, 2006-2009

591

Revenues
UCP-HSNTF provider
assessments and insurer surcharges

320

320

320

320

Local contribution to MCO
supplemental payments

385

0

0

0

Federal financial participation

688

816

888

1,272

Dedicated revenues
Total

0

7

21

219

1,393

1,143

1,229

1,811

Additional, 2006-2009

418

Difference
General fund share

33

166

457

General fund share of net new
annual spending, 2006-2009

205
172

* Data are from the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services. No enrollment increases besides those directly attributable to eligibility changes have been included in this analysis.
Commonwealth Care spending is net of enrollee contributions. Dedicated revenues include new taxes and penalties dedicated to paying for health care reform. Some differences appear not to be exact,
because of rounding. MCO denotes managed-care organization, and UCP-HSNTF uncompensated care pool—Health Safety Net Trust Fund (as the pool is called under health care reform).
SOURCE: Massachusetts Health Care Reform — Near-Universal Coverage at What Cost? NEJM 2009; 361:2012-2015

VERMONT (2011)
The most comprehensive state attempt to achieve universal health
coverage in recent U.S. history occurred in Vermont. Its reform bill,
Act 48, was enacted in 2011, with reformers wanting to improve
upon the ACA to cover the entire population while simultaneously
containing costs.
Elements of Reform. Act 48 instructed the state to develop a
single-payer, government-financed system, called Green Mountain
Care, to provide universal coverage, replacing most health insurance
in Vermont except for Medicare and Tricare. Employees could choose
to keep employer-sponsored health insurance, with Green Mountain
Care as secondary coverage, but the Act anticipated replacing
most employer-sponsored coverage. Non-residents working for
Vermont-based companies would also be covered. The plan offered
a broad array of services, designed to mirror or improve upon existing
coverage for most Vermonters. It required that hospitals and providers
accept 105% of Medicare reimbursement rates for their privately
insured populations, and set an overall cost growth cap of 4%.

Climate for Reform. In 2007, Vermont had enacted a package of
health reforms, including a new program for covering the uninsured
known as Catamount Health. This earlier reform was a product
of political compromise, with private, subsidized coverage offered
to low-income uninsured people. Catamount Health experienced
higher-than-expected costs, the state had less revenue because of
the recession, and the ACA catalyzed advocates who had pushed for
more radical reform in the earlier efforts. Before Act 48 was enacted,
7.6% of non-elderly residents were uninsured in 2009. After the ACA
was implemented, the uninsured rate dropped to 6% (second lowest
in the U.S.), about 31,200 people.
Political Support. In 2010, Peter Shumlin, a progressive Democrat
with a close alliance with Senator Bernie Sanders, ran on a singlepayer platform and won election as Governor. State legislators also
wanted to go beyond the ACA, and push for radical reform. The plan
was bolstered by a strong “Healthcare Is a Human Right” campaign,
and the involvement of well-known health economists William Hsiao
and Jonathan Gruber. Hsiao had experience developing universal
health coverage programs in other countries.

3

FIGURE 2
Financial Estimates from Three Projections for a
Vermont Single-Payer Health Plan*
2011, Harvard

2013, UMass

2014, State of
Vermont

8-12% short term;
24-25% long term

1.5% over 3 yr

1.6% over 5 yr

Employers

9.4% of payroll

Not estimated

11.5% of payroll

Employees

3.1% of household
income

Not estimated

Sliding scale up to
9.5% of household
income

NA

$1.6 million

$2.5 billion

$420 million

$267 million

$106 million

NA

$3.5 billion

$4.3 million

Variable
Estimated savings (%)
Estimated new taxes

Cost gap to be state
financed
New federal revenues
from ACA Section 1332
Total cost of Green
Mountain Care

* ACA denotes Affordable Care Act, NA not applicable, and UMass University of Massachusetts
SOURCE: The Demise of Vermont’s Single-Payer Plan. NEJM 2015; 372:1584-1585

However, in 2014, Gov. Shumlin won re-election by a single
percentage point margin, which left him without a strong mandate
to implement the single-payer promise he had run on. In addition,
the political will to enact the plan waned in the absence of a clear
financing mechanism.
Political Opposition. “Partners for Health Care Reform,” a coalition
of the Vermont Medical Society, Fletcher Allen Health Care, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, Vermont Association of Hospitals and Health
Systems, Vermont Business Roundtable. Vermont Chamber of
Commerce, and the Vermont Assembly of Home Health Agencies,
did not come out explicitly against the plan, but challenged some
of the assumptions regarding provider payments and administrative
savings. The group commissioned a report that estimated the plan
would amount to a 16% cut in payments to doctors and hospitals
(something the state disputed). Public opinion polling in 2011 found
that residents were divided in their support for the law, with 40%
supporting it, 35% opposing it, and 25% unsure. In 2014, polls showed
that the public remained divided, with 40% supporting the plan, 39%
opposing it, and 21% undecided.
Financing. The initial Act provided no financial details, but
directed that a financing plan be produced by 2013. Initial estimates
predicted immediate and longer term savings for the health system
(see Figure 2), and concluded that a new payroll tax of 9.4% for
employers and new income taxes of 3.1% for individuals would replace
health insurance premiums. However, other estimates were not so
optimistic, and Gov. Shumlin did not produce the report of how
much the act would cost until long after it was introduced, which may
have contributed to its failure. Projections kept changing because

anticipated federal revenues from Medicaid and the ACA declined
in the interim, and because the new plan offered ‘platinum’ level
insurance (94% actuarial value) rather than the 87% actuarial value of
the initial estimate. Yet policymakers refused to reduce the offering
to gold-tiered benefits because that would have been a downgrade
in coverage for many Vermont citizens. The plan was also expensive
because it tried to replace federally-subsidized insurance with statesubsidized insurance. In the final, official analysis, the plan would
require raising payroll taxes by 11.5% and income tax by up to 9%, with
lower predicted savings to the health system of 1.6%.
Governing/Decisionmaking Body. Act 48 created the Green
Mountain Care Board with unprecedented, centralized responsibility
for benefits design, coverage, and premiums. It was tasked with
controlling the rate of growth in health care costs and “improving the
health of Vermonters” through a variety of regulatory and planning
tools. These tools included all-payer rate setting and an explicit cost
growth cap (4%). The Board consisted of five Vermonters, nominated
by a broad-based committee and appointed by the Governor.
Outcome. Citing the risk of “economic shock,” Gov. Shumlin pulled
the plan in December 2014, stating that it was not the time to move
forward with a publicly-financed health care system in Vermont. “Our
current way of paying for health care is inequitable. I wanted to fix
this at the state level, and I thought we could. I have learned that
the limitations of state-based financing – limitations of federal law,
limitations of our tax capacity, and sensitivity of our economy – make
that unwise and untenable at this time.”
KEY INSIGHTS:
• T
 he public was divided in its support for radical health reform
when it passed. Three years later, it was just as divided, in the
absence of any sustained effort to educate the public about what
the act did and how it would affect people’s lives. Thus, there was
no groundswell of support when estimates were much higher
than anticipated. Health reform needs significant time and energy
devoted to educating the public about the plan and its financing.
• T
 he state government did not produce a competing narrative to
the complaint about big-government expansion.
• S
 tates must work with hospitals and providers at the table for buy-in
and to develop all-payer rates and limits on cost growth. Vermont’s
inability to bring these players together in support of the bill likely
contributed to its failure.
• It is important to think about the behavioral economics of how a
plan will be received. For example, workers might fail to notice their
employer-based health insurance premiums, but would notice an
increase in their tax bill.
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COLORADO (2016)
Through a ballot initiative in 2016, Colorado was the next state to try
to pass an ambitious, universal health coverage plan (ColoradoCare).
The plan would have replaced most employer-sponsored insurance
coverage, individual market plans, Medicaid, and CHIP with a singlepayer system.
Elements of Reform. ColoradoCare was a taxpayer-financed
system of universal health coverage for all Colorado residents. It
would be created by the state constitution (through Amendment
69), but largely beyond the control of the governor and legislature.
It would replace Medicaid (but not Medicare) and private insurance.
It featured broad coverage, no restrictions on provider networks, no
deductibles, and some copayments.
It would have also replaced the medical care portion of workers’
compensation insurance. Beneficiaries that would have been eligible
for Medicaid or the Children’s Basic Health Plan would have received
benefits required by federal law, in addition to ColoradoCare’s
standard benefits. The wording of Amendment 69, as presented to
the voters on the ballot, is below:

SHALL STATE TAXES BE INCREASED $25 BILLION ANNUALLY IN
THE FIRST FULL FISCAL YEAR, AND BY SUCH AMOUNTS THAT ARE
RAISED THEREAFTER, BY AN AMENDMENT TO THE COLORADO
CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHING A HEALTHCARE PAYMENT SYSTEM
TO FUND HEALTHCARE FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS WHOSE PRIMARY
RESIDENCE IS IN COLORADO, AND, IN CONNECTION THEREWITH,
CREATING A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY CALLED COLORADOCARE
TO ADMINISTER THE HEALTHCARE PAYMENT SYSTEM; PROVIDING
FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF COLORADOCARE BY AN INTERIM
BOARD OF TRUSTEES UNTIL AN ELECTED BOARD OF TRUSTEES
TAKES RESPONSIBILITY; EXEMPTING COLORADOCARE FROM THE
TAXPAYER’S BILL OF RIGHTS; ASSESSING AN INITIAL TAX ON THE TOTAL
PAYROLL FROM EMPLOYERS, PAYROLL INCOME FROM EMPLOYEES,
AND NONPAYROLL INCOME AT VARYING RATES; INCREASING THESE
TAX RATES WHEN COLORADOCARE BEGINS MAKING HEALTHCARE
PAYMENTS FOR BENEFICIARIES; CAPPING THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF
INCOME SUBJECT TO TAXATION; AUTHORIZING THE BOARD TO
INCREASE THE TAXES IN SPECIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES UPON APPROVAL
OF THE MEMBERS OF COLORADOCARE; REQUIRING COLORADOCARE
TO CONTRACT WITH HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS TO PAY FOR
SPECIFIC HEALTHCARE BENEFITS; TRANSFERRING ADMINISTRATION
OF THE MEDICAID AND CHILDREN’S BASIC HEALTH PROGRAMS
AND ALL OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL HEALTHCARE FUNDS FOR
COLORADO TO COLORADOCARE; TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY
TO COLORADOCARE FOR MEDICAL CARE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE
BE PAID FOR BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE; REQUIRING
COLORADOCARE TO APPLY FOR A WAIVER FROM THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT TO ESTABLISH A COLORADO HEALTHCARE PAYMENT
SYSTEM; AND SUSPENDING THE OPERATIONS OF THE COLORADO
HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE AND TRANSFERRING ITS RESOURCES TO
COLORADOCARE?

Climate for Reform. In 2013, 14% of Colorado’s non-elderly residents,
approximately 646,200 people, were uninsured. After implementation
of the ACA, the uninsured rate decreased to 10% (469,600 people),
but parts of Colorado (rural areas with few providers and little insurer
competition) faced skyrocketing premiums and growing cost-sharing.

Political Support. The initiative was shepherded by physician and
Colorado State Sen. Irene Aguilar, a Democrat, and had the support
of slightly more than half of the Democratic-controlled legislature.
It garnered the necessary 100,000 signatures to put it on the ballot
by tapping into public frustrations over rising out-of-pocket costs
and limited coverage. It was supported by ColoradoCareYES, a
community-based organization.
Political Opposition. The Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce
coordinated opposition through a campaign group called Coloradans
for Coloradans. State Treasurer Walker Stapleton, a Republican,
and former Governor Bill Ritter, a Democrat, co-chaired the group.
Gov. John Hickenlooper, a Democrat, also opposed the proposal,
stating, “Our reforms are just beginning to bear fruit…and it would be
premature to dramatically remake our health care system at this time.”
Strong bipartisan political opposition included four U.S. representatives,
more than a dozen state senators, and more than a dozen state
representatives. Sen. Bennet and three former governors spoke out
against it, while candidates up for re-election found it risky to support
the plan. Additionally, influential industries including realtors, bankers,
farmers, contractors, and especially health insurance companies
opposed it.
The measure lost the support of important women’s health groups
due to a fear that because the Colorado state constitution bans the
use of ‘public funds’ for abortion, women covered by ColoradoCare
would not be covered for abortions. By August 2016, the liberal group
ProgressNow Colorado announced its opposition to the measure.
Financing. Unlike Vermont, Colorado did propose a financing plan:
a payroll tax of 10% (pre-tax payroll premiums of 3.33% for employees
and 6.67% for employers), and 10% of all non-payroll income, such as
self-employment and capital gains. The tax would apply to individual
income below $350,000 for a single person, or $450,000 for married
couples filing jointly. Business owners said the extra taxes would have
been burdensome and unpopular, driving business from the state.
When fully implemented, the plan would cost $36 billion, more than
the state’s present budget. An independent, nonpartisan analysis
concluded that the proposed revenue to pay for ColoradoCare would
not keep up with increasing health care costs, resulting in growing
deficits each year.
Governing Body/Decisionmaking. The Amendment proposed
an interim board of 15 members appointed by the Governor and
legislative leaders, followed by a permanent 21-person board of
trustees elected from seven districts across the state. That board would
set benefits and budgets. There was a great deal of fear that the board
would have too much control over health care, and voters would not
have been able to recall the elected board members. Detractors also
said that health care providers could be inadequately reimbursed under
the new system, causing them to stop providing care in Colorado and,
thus, decreasing Coloradans’ health care choices.
Outcome. When Colorado put single payer on the ballot as
Amendment 69 in 2016, it failed badly, with 79% voting against
it. Opponents (Coloradans for Coloradans) outspent supporters
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(ColoradoCareYES) by more than five to one, with messages
focused on the increased tax burden on employees and employers,
and claiming that inadequate reimbursement would lead to a
decrease in health choices.
KEY INSIGHTS:
• A
 ballot initiative, because the language is set early, does not lend
itself well to the process of building support over time for largescale reforms.
• It is clear that tax shock is a severe obstacle to such efforts. Support
for single-payer dramatically drops if a tax hike is imposed. “Shall
state taxes be increased $25 billion annually…” is not likely to be
positively received without a major initiative to educate the public
about savings in the long-term.
• F
 ear of diminished or constrained choices in providers or coverage
proved to be a powerful drawback. There was little appetite for
delegating choices to a board, even an elected one; the public’s
distrust of such governing bodies runs deep.
• F
 ractured coalitions with the loss of women’s health groups proved
problematic.
• W
 ithout unified support from either party’s officials, building
political will for large-scale reform is unlikely.

CALIFORNIA (2017)
The next state to attempt universal health coverage was California. In
June 2017, the California State Senate passed a bill to create “Healthy
California”—a program to create a single health care market in the state.
Elements of Reform. The bill would create the “Healthy California
Trust Fund” in the State Treasury. Federal and state funds previously
allocated to Medicaid, CHIP, Medicare, ACA subsidies, and others
would be deposited in the trust fund. Under the Healthy California
plan, individuals would not be subject to premiums, copayments, or
deductibles. Medical, pharmaceutical, dental, vision, and long-term
care would be provided to all residents—including undocumented
immigrants—free of charge. Providers would be paid Medicare rates.
Climate for Reform. In 2013, 16% of California’s non-elderly
residents, approximately 5.47 million people, were uninsured. After
implementation of the ACA (and Medicaid expansion), the uninsured
rate dropped to 10% (2.95 million people) in 2016. One in three of
California’s remaining uninsured are non-citizens who are not eligible
for any public program of coverage. California has a long history
of campaigns and political leaders who have espoused universal
coverage.
Financing. The bill required the legislature to develop a revenue
plan for Healthy California. Experts estimate the program would

cost about $400 billion per year—double California’s current budget.
California could cover about $200 billion from current federal and
state spending—including Medicaid and Medicare. An additional
$100 to $150 billion could be captured from what employers are
already spending. The additional funding needed could involve a 15%
payroll tax, a 2.3% sales tax, and/or a business tax increase.
Political Support. The powerful California Nurses Association led
the campaign for the bill, with other support from labor unions and
consumer groups. Public support in California for single payer is 65%,
yet drops to 42% if such a plan requires an increase in taxes. Lt. Gov.
Gavin Newsom supports single payer and is running for governor in
2018.
Political Opposition. A wide array of business groups opposed the
measure, including health insurers, manufacturers and the California
Chamber of Commerce, which called the bill a “job killer” because of
the tax burden it would impose on responsible employers. Opponents
also pointed to the lack of cost containment measures that would lead
to budget shortfalls, requiring drastic cuts in services or long waits for
providers.
Governing Body/Decisionmaking. An independent public entity
called the Healthy California Board would govern the program. The
nine-member board would have representatives from the health
care sector, labor, and the general public, and include individuals with
health care experience. The Governor, Senate Committee on Rules,
and Speaker of the Assembly would appoint the board members,
and each member would serve four-year terms. The board would
be responsible for negotiating contracts and payment methods
with health care providers and health care systems, and for seeking
necessary waivers and approvals to allow existing federal healthrelated payments to be made directly to the program.
Outcome. California Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon shelved
the plan in June 2017, citing a lack of a funding mechanism that
would allow it to deliver the care and coverage that it promised. The
measure is likely to be reconsidered in the 2018 legislative session.
KEY INSIGHTS:
• T
 he California plan is about as ambitious, and disruptive, as has
been introduced.
• T
 he plan faced significant hurdles both politically and practically. It
would require a variety of federal waivers of existing Medicaid and
Medicare regulations, and the financing mechanism would need to
be developed.
• T
 he lack of a defined financing mechanism for California’s proposal
left even its supporters unable to proceed.
• B
 ecause the plan would create a true single-payer market (replacing
all present insurance, both public and private) it faced predictable
continued on next page 
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and well-funded opposition from those whose livelihoods were at
stake (such as health insurers).
• C
 alifornia is one of the success stories in terms of implementing the
ACA and creating a robust individual market. The fact that many
of its remaining uninsured cannot obtain coverage through ACArelated provisions (due to citizenship status) provides incentive to
pursue disruptive change.

NEVADA (2017)
In 2017, the Nevada legislature passed a plan to take the state closer
to universal health coverage by building on the existing multi-payer
model. It leverages the structure and negotiated rates of Medicaid
to create a “public option” plan on the state exchange. It should be
noted that although the plan would be available to all, it would not be
subsidized—making it a vehicle for incremental progress, while unlikely
to achieve universal coverage on its own.
Elements of Reform. The Medicaid-buy in model —known as
“Sprinkle Care” after its namesake and champion, State Rep. Mike
Sprinkle, a Democrat – would have been the first state program to
allow individuals of all incomes to buy into Medicaid, at full cost; lowincome people who qualify for tax credits under the ACA would have
the option to use those credits to buy Medicaid-style coverage on the
state’s Health Insurance Exchange. Employer-sponsored insurance
and Medicare would have been maintained, but a commercial
insurance product resembling the state’s Medicaid coverage would
have provided consumers a new option and leveraged the state’s
lower Medicaid reimbursement rates. The bill was only four pages
long, and provided limited information on costs, premiums, and costsharing.
Climate for Reform. Prior to the implementation of the ACA, 22%
of Nevada’s non-elderly population (522,200 people) were uninsured
in 2013, one of the highest rates in the nation. A number of factors
accounted for the high rate of uninsured, including Nevada’s high rate
of service sector jobs and low-wage jobs without health benefits, as
well as a high level of unemployment.
Under the ACA, that percentage was cut in half, primarily because
of Nevada’s Medicaid expansion, in which enrollment grew by 90%.
Nevada’s Gov. Brian Sandoval was the first Republican Governor
to choose to expand Medicaid after the Supreme Court made it
optional. According to Rep. Sprinkle, the idea for the bill sprung from
two dynamics: first, the new Administration’s support for a greater
state role in health reform decisions, and second, ambiguity and
uncertainty around whether the ACA would continue to exist. A
primary motive to move the bill was to give the Medicaid expansion
population an option to buy-in if the ACA were repealed and the
state lost the significant federal subsidy that enabled it to expand
Medicaid in the first place.

Political Support. In 2017, Democrats controlled both chambers of
the Nevada Legislature, which meets every other year. During floor
votes on the House and Senate floors, there was no debate even as
the bill passed along largely party lines. Nearly one in four Nevada
residents is insured by Medicaid, which enjoys broad popular support.
Political Opposition. The Nevada Hospital Association, along with
other health care providers, voiced concerns about the new plan
reimbursing them at lower rates. However, they remained neutral,
given the lack of detail about whether the plan might displace private
payers or primarily be an option for people who were uninsured or at
risk of losing their existing Medicaid coverage.
Financing. No details. According to Rep. Sprinkle, the state insurance
commissioner was prepared to obtain an actuarial estimate of the
premiums and costs once the bill was signed. The goal, he said, was to
offer a premium that “is affordable, but that is also not going to cause
such marketplace disruption that we lose a private insurance industry
that we obviously need in the state.” Because the bill included no state
subsidies for the plan, its effect on taxpayers would be minimal, with
administrative costs built into the premium calculation.
Governing Body/Decisionmaking. The Nevada Medicaid
Department would manage the new program, which would be
separate from the Medicaid program. The department would have
the option to contract with managed care organizations (MCOs), as it
does with four MCOs in the Medicaid program in the more populous
areas of Nevada.
Outcome. In June 2017, Gov. Sandoval, a Republican, vetoed the
plan, writing that the legislation was “an undeveloped remedy to an
undefined problem.” He also expressed concern that many people
buying into the plan would be those with private insurance, rather
than the uninsured. Proponents vowed to bring the plan back for
consideration in the next legislative session in 2019.
KEY INSIGHTS:
• A
 Medicaid buy-in approach made sense in a state that saw its
uninsured rate decline significantly through Medicaid expansion.
• T
 he bill passed quickly in reaction to the threat of ACA repeal and
particularly threats to federal Medicaid funding.
• T
 he plan had a short timeline for start-up, with a target date of
January 2019, with few details on how the plan would actually work.
This likely contributed to its failure.
• T
 he plan sought to build upon Nevada’s existing framework, which
includes four managed care companies with Medicaid contracts. In
so doing, it attempted to avoid severe pushback from the insurance
industry.
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EMERGING QUESTIONS AND THEMES
This review summarizes prominent recent attempts at the state level to adopt health reforms that could improve health care access through
expanding coverage to all residents. As such, each state operates as a case study in building, or failing to build, the popular and political will
towards reform. What might we learn across the experience of very different states, proposing very different solutions?

GETTING TO THE FINISH LINE

BUILDING POLITICAL COALITIONS

States that have pursued universal health coverage often have
relatively low percentages of uninsured residents, meaning that the
gaps in coverage they have to fill may be small. But paradoxically, it
may be harder to build the support to pass a broad proposal when
the coverage problem is limited. In the face of small coverage gaps,
disruptive reforms may encounter majorities of the public fearful of
changes to their existing coverage and thus more skeptical of change.

Although universal health care is often considered a Democratic
issue, the example of Massachusetts shows that it can be a Republican
one as well. Conversely, the example of Colorado shows that health
reform can cause intraparty division and bipartisan opposition,
especially if it conflicts with other party priorities.

BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT
Educating the public about present health care costs and existing
financing mechanisms is key. An understanding of this dynamic is
essential to understanding the “problem” and countering the message
of higher taxes. Financing through taxes leaves taxpayers (and the
proposals) vulnerable to health care costs that grow at greater rates
than revenue sources.
FINANCING
These proposals had varying levels of information as to the financing
for the reforms. Some efforts floundered by either not offering
information about how their policy would be fiscally sustainable,
or by proposing drastic tax increases that faced backlash from the
public and business community. Massachusetts found success by
demonstrating the program could be paid for by reallocating existing
funding sources and would require minimal new state funds, in the
“shared responsibility” model.
STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
Building a broad stakeholder coalition in support of coverage
expansion proposals is an important element of success in swaying
public opinion and political support. Influential stakeholders who
feel left out, or who feel their interests may be threatened, are likely
to galvanize opposition to efforts to expand coverage. In particular,
hospitals and other providers should be brought in early to address
concerns about the long-term adequacy of payments.

COUNTERING THE OPPOSITION
Single-payer proposals create the impression of larger government
at the expense of the private sector, while an all-payer model raises
the specter of price setting and price caps. In either case, getting the
language right is essential, to avoid concepts that prompt immediate
opposition. The example of Massachusetts shows that messaging
such as “shared responsibility” can be used to counter these objections
effectively.
DETAILS
One unanswered question is whether including details in an initial
proposal is a help or hindrance to initial buy-in. It may be the case
that when building upon existing frameworks, detailed plans are not
needed for buy-in; but when planning for disruptive change, detailed
financing and payment plans are essential in fully educating the public,
or opponents may fill the void with scare tactics.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Implementing universal coverage in a state, by almost any mechanism,
must involve buy-in from the federal government in terms of waiver
approvals. It is important for proponents to understand what the
parameters of that approval might be, and to frame state debates
within the context of the federal government’s likely reaction.
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FUTURE STATE EFFORTS
Expanding health coverage to all people is a popular idea, but not a monolithic one. In
the coming years, many states will consider a variety of approaches specific to their needs,
population, economic characteristics, and political will for reform. Some state leaders are
pursuing a single-payer model, and others are looking to find market-based solutions with a
mix of public and private payers.
Our future analyses will examine and track developments at the state level to catalogue and
share lessons learned, and inform state lawmakers as they consider alternatives. As they do,
we will update this review and build on the foundation of both the successes and the failures.
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This review was prepared by Janet Weiner, Rebecka Rosenquist, and Erin Hartman at Penn
LDI. It was produced as part of a research partnership between United States of Care and
Penn LDI, and we thank reviewers from both organizations for their valuable input.
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